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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of
Appellate procedure,

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
In this case Plaintiff had a civil claim for personal injury
against Salt Lake County.

On contacting the County to determine

which member of its governing body was designated to receive civil
claims, Plaintiff's attorney was told by the County that it had
designated Trish McDonald with the Salt Lake County Attorney's
Office to receive the claims.

He then called Ms. McDonald who

confirmed that advice and said send the claim to her.

He did so.

He then negotiated settlement of the claim with the County for a
substantial period of time. After one year had run from the date
of the accident, and after Plaintiff had filed her civil complaint,
the County then claimed that the claim had not been properly served
because it was not addressed to the County per se, but to Trish.
This gives rise to the following issues:
As the County was served as it directed, and the County
had the authority to designate its attorney to receive the claim,
wasn't the service proper in the first place?
In addition, should not the County he estopped?
Finally, the trial court, without hearing, granted the
-v-

County's

motion, without

making

any

findings

addressing the issues of agency or estoppel.

of

facts, nor

In making such

summary disposition, Plaintiff claims the court erred.
Finally, if under the circumstances the Court feels the
County and/or its attorney were wrong in first directing the claim
to be addressed in a certain way, and then later taking advantage
of what they had directed for the purpose of denying Plaintiff her
day in court, is this conduct such that Plaintiff should be awarded
fees for the appeal?

-vi-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff has a claim against Salt Lake County for personal
injuries sustained in her automobile accident caused by negligent
driving of a Salt Lake County employee.

During negotiations the

County has previously paid her $680 in settlement of her property
damage claim for damage to her vehicle.
Plaintiff seeks to return to the trial court to recover
appropriate personal injury damages.
The case is before this court now because the trial court
dismissed her complaint because she failed as a preliminary matter
to give proper notice of her claim to the Salt Lake County
Commission.
Plaintiff claims the trial court erred in so ruling.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This Appeal is from a Final Judgement granting Defendant's
Rule 12(b)(i) U.R.C.P. Motion to Dismiss for lack of Jurisdiction,
the issue being whether Plaintiff properly served notice of a civil
claim against Salt Lake County.
February 1, 1993, Plaintiff injured by Salt Lake County vehicle.
April 22, 1993, Plaintiff serves notice of civil claim on Salt Lake
County.
1

January 28, 1994, Plaintiff files suit against the County and it's
driver, Heather Merritt.
February 22, 1994, County Motion to Dismiss under 12(b)(3) U.R.C.P.
March 29, 1994, County Motion granted and case dismissed.
April 28, 1994, Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal Order.
June 13, 1994, Motion to Set Aside Denied.
June 27, 1994, Notice of Appeal Filed.
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4.

These are very explicit instructions.

April 22, 1993.

McDonald.

It gave Plaintiff's counsel Trish's

Plaintiff's counsel called Ms. Trish

She told him the Commission's instruction to him was

correct, the claim should be sent to her, and gave him her room
number and address.

These are also explicit instructions.

He

then, on the same day, readdressed his letter from the Commission
to her, sent it to her certified mail, and received back the mail
receipt signed by her.
5.

In

so

acting,

Plaintiff's

counsel

accepted

the

Commission's designation of her, as representative of its attorney,
as its agent to receive the claim, and her confirmation of that
agency.
6.

April, 1993 - January, 1994. Plaintiff's counsel and the

County Attorney actively work together on the merits of Plaintiff's
claim. First Trish acted for the County, then Colleen Cronin, took
over.

In May, 1993, the County issued its check to Plaintiff

paying her $680 property damage claim for the damage to her
vehicle.
7.

Plaintiff's personal injury claim remained open.
Plaintiff does not contend that mailing to the County

Attorney is the County's standard practice.

In this case though,

as he made the preliminary inquiry to the Commission, these were
the directions given him.
8.

As time went on during these negotiations, it became

apparent that the case could not be readily resolved.
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C. With this health history, Plaintiff had a very major
claim for damages against the County, while the County obviously
had the right to fully offset any pre-existing problems, and stand
responsible only for what degree of aggravation the accident caused
that could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

It also

became obvious that it would take a substantial amount of time for
Plaintiff to reach a plateau, a permanent condition, as a base from
which her doctors could assess the degree to which her new
disability was caused by the accident as opposed to the degree to
which it was attributable to her pre-existing condition. Plaintiff
believed she had until July 22, 1994, to file suit under 63-30-15
U.C.A., which provides a claim not admitted is inferentially denied
90 days after its filing, and then gives the claimant one year from
that date in which to file suit.

She thought her suit was filed

not late, but six months early in January, 1994. Plaintiff had not
taken, and does not take the position that the County admitted
liability or waived apportionment of negligence, by its earlier
paying her property damage claim, as such is frequently done by
defendants in similar cases where the claim of liability is strong,
as a practical matter and no waiver of defenses is made thereby.
9.

January 28, 1994. Accordingly, as a year from the date

of Plaintiff's accident approached, and her claim was neither
admitted nor rejected, Plaintiff's counsel advised the County
Attorney that, as the full discovery afforded by litigation and
time, were both needed, that he would file a formal Complaint and
6
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the County to send her the claim as she was authorized to receive
it?

As neither fact is denied, both are admitted. (Rule 8,

U.R.C.P.)
14.

As a matter of fact, if the County itself had chosen to

file an affidavit in opposition to Plaintiff's counsel's verified
Answer which stated these facts (Ex. 3), it had full opportunity
and freedom to do so.
expected.

Such a response, if he erred, wold be

The Commission would have done that had it been proper.

Plaintiff believes the factual reason the Commission did not do so,
was that Plaintiff's counsel's statement of facts was known by it
to be entirely correct.
15.

There is a tension between the County and its Attorney.

There is no word in the record from the County itself denying it
was served as it directed.
16.

The factual focus should be on what really happened - the

County Attorney has changed position.
17.

First, the County Attorney says - send us the claim as

designated, authorized attorney for the County, then it negotiates
the claim. In all this it properly acts as attorney - agent of the
County.
18.

Second, as soon as the one year statute of limitations to

file a claim has run, the County Attorney then says it is not the
County's agent, so Plaintiff's believing what it and the County
said is fatal to her claim.
19.

The tension referred to above is clear now - while the
8
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Proceciui ai ! \

I ho con it oi ion! in

this case with no findings ot tact,
p r e c l u d e d a summary disposition.
9

' - \ summary disposition '^f

.,.:> :ar+"s w e r e «n i ssue t

or

On the merits the issue is whether a county may not be served
with a civil claim in the manner it directs, even though that is a
slight variation from the manner provided by statute.

With that,

as the County admitted it made such direction, which Plaintiff
followed, is not the County estopped from denying proper service?
Also, as the County acknowledges receipt of the claim and its
processing by the County Attorney staff members assigned to civil
claims so that there is no prejudice to the County, is not the
dismissal hypertechnical?
ARGUMENT
Point 1.
THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW OF AN APPEAL FROM A RULE 12
(b)(2), U.R.C.P. DECISION IS TO GIVE NO DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL
COURT'S RULING.
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d

194

(Utah 1991), holds that because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6)
ruling is a question of law, the Appellate Court gives the Trial
Court's ruling no deference and reviews it under a correctness
standard.
In this case Defendant's motion was under 12(b)(2), lack of
jurisdiction, but the rationale is the same as for Rule 12(b)(6).
Defendant proposes in its Motion for Summary Disposition this
Court should follow Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
accordingly broad discretion should be given the Trial Court in
deference to its decision.
10
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AS PLAINTIFF PROPERLY SERVED HER CIVIL CLAIM NOTICE ON SALT
LAKE COUNTY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING HER SUIT, AND AT
THE LEAST AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDES ENTRY OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Park rity Assoc

v. Board of Education, I'M 4 Utah Adv. Rep, 39

(July ;>' ", j.994), is the most recent appellate sLaLejueul
It so holds,
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..eerinqs v. Utah State Bar, ._
1 1

P. 2d 320 (Utah, 1991). Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P.
The rulings of the trial judge, (Ex, 5 & 9) showed no analysis
of the three dispositive admitted facts:
designated

(1)

that the County

its attorney, the Salt Lake County Attorney, and

specifically Trish McDonald to receive the claim,
Lake County, through Trish, confirmed

(2) that Salt

that advice, and also

directed Plaintiff's counsel to mail the claim to Ms, McDonald, and
(3) the County Attorney then negotiated Plaintiff's claim in the
interest of the County for nine months.
In the trial judge failing to deal with these facts, some
complaint may be made of the briefing submitted to the trial court
by the County Attorney.

In each of its pleadings, (Ex. 2, 4, & 7)

these read simply as if Plaintiff had sua sponte misaddressed her
claim from the "governing body" of the County (60-30-13) to its
attorney.

They omit all reference to the facts. They do not deny

the three above dispositive facts stated by Plaintiff in her
Answer, and thereby admit them as true.
Rule 56(c),(e), U.R.C.P., together with Rule 8(d) U.R.C.P.("General Rules of Pleadings-effect of failure to deny"), all hold
that facts properly alleged are deemed admitted if not denied and
that denials must be made in such form as would be admissible in
evidence and must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify as to the matter stated therein.
admitted.

Facts not denied are

Gerard v. Young, 432 P. 2d 343 (Utah 1968).

Supply v. Saurini, 775 P. 2d 420 (Utah 1989).
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Treloggan v.

Treloggan, 669 P. 2d 747 (Utah 1985).

Here, there is nothing in the record to indicate Mr. Sawaya is
competent to testify to all acts of the County Commission, so the
portion of his affidavit (Ex. 7) stating the County did not "waive
the notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act," is
both incompetent and immaterial.
not the County

It is incompetent because he is

and has no known authority

statements for it.

to make

factual

It is immaterial because it is not in point.

The point is not whether the County waived the Immunity Act.

The

point is whether the County designated its attorney to receive a
civil claim, not waiving the act, but simply ensuring its most
efficient

application.

Every

experienced

administrator

and

attorney, whether representing large institutions or dealing with
them from the outside, has had occasions when important papers have
had no response because they weren't submitted to the person
knowledgeable and responsive.
The County designating Trish to receive the claim was simply
its effort to have the claim received by such a person. This is no
waiver

of

immunity.

It is a delegation

of authority, the

designation of an agent to act for the County in receiving and
processing the claim.
Rule 5(b) U.R.C.P.

Service: How Made. (1) States "whenever

under these rules service required are permitted to be made upon a
party represented by an attorney this service shall be made upon
the attorney."
13

Rule 4(e) (11) U.R.C.P. Personal Service.

Provides service

can be made "upon a department or agency of the State of Utah, or
upon any public board, commission or body, subject to suit, by
delivering a copy to any member of its governing board, or its
executive employee or secretary."
The attorney for a municipal entity does not come exactly
within any of these designations, but certainly a County Attorney
is in a real sense an executive employee of the County whom the
attorney serves.
Here, the County permitted and directed (Rule 5(b) U.R.C.P.)
its attorney to receive a legal paper.
Counties do not exist as corporeal bodies. As a municipality
can act only through its agents, it may certainly designate the
appropriate agent, for its own purposes, to act for it, including
the receipt of papers.
That is all this case about.

The County Attorney has

submitted no law disputing Plaintiff's basic contention that the
"governing body" of the County (63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated) had
such authority.
In sum, had the County Attorney commenced its 12(b) Motion to
Dismiss by advising the court forthrightly of the three vital facts
and of its change of position after the one year claim statute of
limitations had run, the trial court would undoubtedly have held
that the County either was properly serve,d being served as it had
directed, or that it would be estopped from denying the propriety
14

of service, or that, under these circumstances, complaint of such
service would be a hyper-technicality not serving justice
Plaintiff is a human, severely injured by the County.

More

should be needed than we have here to deny her a day in Court. (See
Point 4)
At

any

rate, the

issue

of

fact

is

there

and

summary

disposition is not appropriate until it has been disposed of.
An interesting way of approaching this matter of the County
Attorney taking a position while ignoring the facts is well set out
in the June, 1994 edition of Discover Magazine at page 42, in its
discussion of the analytic concept of "reductionism".
Discover explains that "reductionism" is expounding on the X
of an equation while ignoring the Y.
As an example, one might say he is justified in refusing to
pay taxes because they cost him money, the X, while ignoring the
governments need for funding for highways, etc., the Y.
Discover says:
"Reductionism is the extrapolation of a sound and worthy
concept to the degree that it becomes removed from the larger
reality of life."
The County Attorney has applied reductionism in this case. It
implicitly admits the facts Plaintiff asserts, but ignores them.
In essence it argues X - the claim is addressed to the County
Attorney contrary to statutory language - and ignores the Y - this
was done because the County and its attorney so requested.
15

Is there not something badly wrong in an attorney-agent, who
actively acts as agent for a long time, then saying the other party
was, in essence, a fool for believing the attorney's own words and
acts, by the attorney then denying it was an agent?

This is when,

as here, the attorney admits all of its work and acts as agent, but
says these should just be ignored as if they were not facts. This
is reductionism in an extreme form and not to be accepted from an
attorney
Those facts simply cannot be ignored.
As result, Plaintiff conceives this case to be a single issue,
which is really a non-issue. Nothing wrong was done. There is no
conflict between Plaintiff and the County.
If for any reason that point fails, Plaintiff then addresses
the secondary issues of estoppel (Argument Point 3) and hypertechnicality (Argument Point 4).
With that, if the primary issue is accepted, Plaintiff adds an
issue asking that she receive her fees and costs for all time
expended herein since receipt of the County Attorney's motion (not
asked by her at the trial level), or at least in connection with
this appeal (Argument Point 5).
What should happen in this case, is that the Order of
Dismissal should be reversed and the case should be referred
immediately back to the Trial Court, because Plaintiff is now in a
position where her injuries have been adequately defined, she needs
to get to court promptly and the County Attorney should no longer
16

be allowed to stand in her way.

Point 3
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, SALT LAKE COUNTY IS ESTOPPED
FROM DENYING IT WAS PROPERLY SERVED WITH PLAINTIFF1S CLAIM.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW.
"Estoppel" is a matter of law.

As such, where the facts

justify use of the doctrine, no deference should be accorded the
Trial Court. Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P. 2d 715,
718 (Utah 1982).
It is difficult, but not impossible, to estop a County.
As a general rule estoppel cannot be asserted against a
governmental agency, but there is an exception where the interests
of justice mandate.

Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County,

805 P. 2d 789 (Utah App. 1991) held the exception applied when:
"... the interests of justice mandate an exception to the
general rule.

In cases where such an issue arises, the

critical inquiry is whether it appears that the facts may be
found with such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is
of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception."

(At 792).

Accord, Consolidation Coal v. Utah Division of State Lands,
253 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1994).
A case quite close to this on the facts is Eldridae v. Utah
State Retirement Bd., 795 P. 2d 671 (Utah App. 1990), involving a
state employee who had five years of service, left the state, then
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returned and worked twenty more years. When the state announced an
employee with twenty-five years could retire he asked as to whether
his

five previous years

service would

count.

On a strict

interpretation of the retirement rules, his service did not count,
but members of the State Retirement Board misinterpreted their own
rules, told him it did apply and his five years did
count, so when his necessary time was completed, including those
early years, he retired.

He was then barred from receiving full

retirement.
On appeal it was held the state was estopped from denying him
full benefits under the circumstances.
Mr. Eldridge's reliance on advice given him by officials of
the state, the fact of the advice, and his detriment are very
similar to Plaintiff's reliance on the County Commission and its
Attorney.
Eldridge summarized the exception to the non-estoppel rules
succinctly, stating:
"As a general rule under case law, the doctrine of
estoppel is not assertable against the state and its agencies.
Utah courts have, however, carved out an exception to this
general common law rule in unusual circumstances "where it is
plain that the interests of justice so require."

In cases

where such an interest arises, the critical inquiry is whether
it appears that the facts may be found with such certainty,
and the injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to
18

invoke the exception."
Accord, Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P. 2d 715, 718
(Utah 1982).

It uses language particularly appropriate here:

"We have no doubt about the soundness nor the salutary
purpose of the rule that estoppel generally is not assertable
against the government or governmental institutions.

There

are good and sufficient reasons for that rule, including the
safeguarding of the interests of the public, which are often
somewhat in hazard because of the vagaries of political tides,
freguent changes of public officials, the possibility of
collusion, or of circumventing procedures set up by law, then
suing for the value of goods furnished or services rendered.
Notwithstanding our approval of that rule, like most general
rules, there are exceptions when its rigid application would
defeat, rather than serve, the higher purpose that all rules
are intended to serve; that of doing justice, (emphasis added)
The rule is therefore applied when it will serve that purpose.
But in unusual circumstances, when it is plainly apparent that
its application would result in injustice, and there would be
no substantial adverse effect on public policy, the courts
will honor the higher purpose of doing justice by invoking the
exception, rather than departing from that desired objective
in slavish adherence to a general rule."
The above guote is entirely in harmony with the whole purpose
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as stated at Rule 1(a) that
19

the rules "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action."
This Rule is really the guiding light for the conduct of all
practice.

It seems to be so simple and eloquent, and on point,

that it gets overlooked for more technical basis of guidance.
Recapitulating the facts for the purpose of this point, the
Salt Lake County Commission itself does not deny that it had actual
notice of Plaintiff's claim, nor does it assert that it was
prejudiced in any way by the claim being addressed to Ms. McDonald.
It does not deny Ms. McDonald was designated by it to receive the
claim, it does not deny that the Salt Lake County Attorney was
authorized by it to process civil claims against it, nor does it
deny that Plaintiff's counsel reasonably and in good faith acted on
the basis of the instructions and conduct of the County through its
Commission and Attorney in acting as he did.
If the Court reviews Exhibit 1, it is clear that the claim is
carefully drafted to cover every single requirement of 63-31-11
(Claim-Contents),

Utah

Code

Annotated,

except

for

it

being

specifically addressed to Trish McDonald, and that address occurred
because

Plaintiff's

counsel

readdressed

his

letter

from

the

Commission Attorney to the County Commission in compliance with
them telling him to do so.
Equitable estoppel covers this matter, even against a County.
The principle is well stated in FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen
Dairy, 617 P. 2d 327 (Utah 1980) which held equitable estoppel is
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intended
"...to prevent one party from deluding or inducing
another into a position where he will unduly suffer loss. As
applicable here, the test is whether there is conduct, by act
or omission, by which one party, knowingly leads another
party, reasonably relying thereon, to take some course of
action, which will result in his detriment if the first party
is

allowed

to

repudiate

or

deny

his

conduct

or

representation."
FMA is square on point here.

The County, or at least the

County Attorney, seeks to repudiate and deny their previous conduct
and representations.
Point 4
AS

SALT LAKE COUNTY WAS PROPERLY

SERVED FOR EVERY

FUNCTIONAL PURPOSE, AND SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE DISMISSING THIS CASE
ON THE PRESENT BASIS WOULD BE A HYPER-TECHNICALITY, NEEDLESSLY
HARMFUL TO PLAINTIFF AND, AS SUCH, NOT JUSTIFIED BY LAW.
STANDARD OF REVIEW.

The standard of review is not precisely

defined. It would seem appropriate that a reviewing Court has full
authority to reverse a lower Court without deference to the lower
Courts conclusions of law, when the facts show the lower Courts
decision is hypertechnical.
The court makes no claim it was prejudicial.
received the claim in the manner it requested.

It admits it

It admits it was

fully advised in every way Utah Code Ann. Sections 63-30-11 & 13,
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provided for it's protection.

Still, Defendant says Plaintiff

shall have no day in court because the first line of her claim says
"Trish McDonald".
Rule 61. U.R.C.P. Harmless Error.
"No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in
anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the
parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial
justice.

The court at every stage of the proceeding must

disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not
affect the substantial right of the parties.
See also Wells v. Walker Bank and Trust Co., 590 P. 2d 1261
(Utah 1979) at 1263.

Wells not only covers the principle of law

that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, i.e.,
Salt Lake County is responsible for the authorized acts of its
Attorney.

It also holds, at page 1263:
"When a motion to dismiss is made, the trial court should
adhere to a policy of being reluctant to turn a party out
of court without a trial. A dismissal which does so is
a severe measure and such a motion should be granted only
when it clearly appears that the party would not be
entitled to relief under any stated facts provable in
support of its claim.

In ruling on such a motion, the
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court should accept as true all material allegations and
such reasonable inferences as to proof that properly
could be adduced thereunder."
There is no word in the record of any prejudice to the County.
There is none.
This is the kind of hyper-technicality opposed to the concept
of Rule 61, supra, and Wells and Utah State University v. Sutro
supra.

Such a concept also flys directly in the face of the most

important of all of the rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1, with its
three magnificent adjectives that the Rules "shall be liberally
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action".
Point 5
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL.
STANDARD OF REVIEW.
discretion.
Rule

An Appellate Court awards fees at its own

Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

33, Utah

Rules

of Appellate

Procedure, defines a

frivolous appeal, motion, brief or other paper as "one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a
good faith argument. . ."
Plaintiff

submits

that

the

case

is

on

appeal

due

to

unwarranted pleadings filed by Salt Lake County on behalf of the
Salt Lake County Commission.
Their omission of the vital facts necessary to fully advise
the trial court does not meet the requirements of Rule 11,
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U.R.C.P., as the County and its Attorney had a duty to tell Judge
Frederick that Plaintiff's claim was addressed to the County
Attorney, not the Commission, only because both the commission and
its attorney told him to do so.
In violation of Rule 11, the County Attorney breached that
duty.
There is only one reason it did so.

Judge Frederick would

have denied their Motion out of hand had he been fully advised.
In this sense, the "Motion" pursuant to Rule 33, U.R.A.P. is
frivolous as it is not grounded in fact nor warranted by existing
law.
Plaintiff has been required to defend an unjustified motion
and, as such, is entitled to costs and fees.
Plaintiff did not ask for fees in the trial court.

She asks

now for fees and costs on this appeal for the policy reasons
comparable to those in Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission,
244 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (July 29, 1994).
Granted her claim is of lesser moment to the public in
general, the County Attorney's manner of conduct in seeking to keep
her out of court, was intended to cause her devastating loss.
Particularly not to be countenanced is that the County Attorney,
professional

lawyers, induced her to file her claim with it

directly and specifically, induced her to remain in negotiations
with it to settle her claim until the statute of limitations had
run on it, and then immediately denied it had any authority to so
24

induce or act.
This conduct is reprehensible.
For the County Attorney now to say it had its fingers crossed
is unacceptable.
Rule 1, U.R.C.P. states that civil procedure should be handled
in such a manner as to be just, speedy and inexpensive.
Through its conduct, the County has violated each of those
adjectives.
Plaintiff is a person, a citizen. Already she has suffered a
full years delay.

That is genuine harm.

Not justified.

Fees should be awarded, as above, and in addition, as per
Stewart, supra, due to the character of this case in which the
County Attorney simply ignored all of its own conduct and that of
the Commission is wrong.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff prays Judge Frederick's Order be reversed, the case
forthwith returned to the trial court, and that she recover her
fees and costs for this appeal.
Respectfully submitted.
DATED February 16, 19 95.
Samuel King
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to
Michael E. Postma, Salt Lake County Attorney, 2001 South State
Street, Rm. S-3400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200, February *k€f
1995.
if

Samuel King
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ADDENDUM

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
63-30-13.CLAIM AGAINST POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OR ITS EMPLOYEE

—

TIME FOR FILING NOTICE.
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of
his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the
governing body of the political subdivision within one year after
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time
granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.

63-30-14.

CLAIM

FOR

INJURY

~

APPROVAL

OR

DENIAL

BY

GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY OR INSURANCE CARRIER WITHIN
NINETY DAYS.
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental
entity or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the
claimant in writing of its approval or denial.

A claim shall be

deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day period
the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has failed to
approve or deny the claim.
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63-30-15.

DENIAL OF CLAIM FOR INJURY -- AUTHORITY AND TIME FOR
FILING ACTION AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY.

(1)

If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an

action in the district court against the governmental entity or an
employee of the entity.
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after
denial of the claim or within one year after the denial period
specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of whether or not
the

function

giving

rise

to the

claim

is

characterized

governmental.

REPRODUCTION OF OPINIONS, CENTRAL DOCUMENTS
These are attached as Exhibits 1-9
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KING & DENT
Attorneys
at Law
ue! King
old J. Dent, Jr.
c P. Hartmn

An Association of Sole Practitioners
2120 South 1300 East, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

April 22,

Telephone (801)486-3751
Fax Ho. (801)486-3753

1993

RECEIVED
Ms. Trish McDonald
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
APR 2 3 f0::3
201 South State St.—S-3400
Salt Lake City, DT 84190-1200
COUNTY ATTORNEY
Re: Caren A. Bichsel-claimant
R'SK MANAGEMENT
Heather J. Merritt—county representative
Dear Ms. McDonald:
On February 1, 1993, an accident occurred involving three vehicles.
Heather J. Merritt was driving a Salt Lake County 1985 blue
Citation, license number 133 85 EX. Felicia Hill was driving a
1978 Oldsmobile stationwagon.
My client, Caren Bichsel, was
driving a 1980 Ford Thunderbird.
The accident occurred at approximately 3:45 P.M. at 3546 South 700
West.
Ms. Bichsel, driving north, was going to turn into the
Children's Shelter. She saw Heather's vehicle coming out of the
shelter parking lot onto 7th West. She saw Heather looking at her
rather than north for oncoming traffic.
At the same time, Ms.
Bichsel saw the vehicle driven by Felicia traveling south on 7th
West.
Ms. Bichsel had her turn signal on. It appeared to her there would
be a collision because Heather was pulling into the street right in
front of the line being followed by Felicia. Ms. Bichsel applied
her brakes and stopped south of where she would have made the turn
into the Shelter parking lot. Heather started to enter 7th West,
turning south.
Ms. Hill swerved left, toward Ms. Bichsel, but
still hit the rear of Heather's vehicle•
The impact flipped
Felicia's vehicle sideways and it collided head-on with the Bichsel
vehicle which was then stopped.
That is, it hit the front of Ms.
Bichsel's car with the side of Felicia's.
Ms. Bichsel's understanding was that Heather was a volunteer
driving children for the county. She was also told that Heather
had just completed defensive driving school two days before.
Photographs of the accident were taken by Tony Montano, a county
employee. The accident was investigated by Deputy R. E. Rook, Salt
Lake County Sheriff's office.

Ms. Trish McDonald
April 22, 1993
Page 2
It would seem the accident was directly caused by the failure to
keep a proper lookout of Heather.
There may be a question of
contributory negligence on the part of Felicia.
That is, should
she have reacted sooner as Ms. Bichsel did?
Injury;
Before this accident occurred, Ms. Bichsel, who had been
a long line semi-truck driver, had had three back operations
resulting from vehicle accidents. Two were performed in Salt Lake
County by Dr. Robert Home.
The last one was performed by Dr.
Robert Williams, a neurologist in LasVegas.
As a result, Ms.
Bichsel is receiving early total disability benefits from Social
Security. Her medical bills are met by Medicare and Medicaid.
Since this accident occurred, Ms. Bichsel, who was ambulatory and
capable of driving, has had her pre-existing back problems greatly
worsened together with new problems incident to the collision. She
had her seat belt fastened when the accident occurred. She has had
medical expense to date for injuries through her back from neck to
lumbar area of almost $4,000 to date.
We are unable to evaluate the degree of her injury at this time
because of the pre-existing complications.
The neck is a new
problem. Her prior injuries have not involved it.
Ms. Bichsel is being attended by Wayne Hebertson, neurologist, as
primary attending physician.
She is receiving physical therapy
from Lance Himelwright at Cottonwood Hospital. To this date, 2 1/2
months after the accident, she has endured an intense level of pain
that she wasn't suffering prior to the accident and is disabled to
a higher degree than she had been before the accident. She can't
drive. She receives taxi through welfare and Grocery Maid for her
groceries.
Damages: I would estimate Ms. Bichsel's damages incident to
February 1, 1993, accident at a minimum of $100,000.

the

Enclosed is Ms. Bichsel's authorization for me and my associate,
Harold J. Dent, Jr., to represent Caren in regard to this accident.
Please contact me concerning this matter.
Sincerely,
SAMUEL KING
SK/has
cc: Caren Bichsel
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DAVID-E. YOCOM

(#3581")

Salt Lake County Attorney
By: MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313)
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (810) 468-3421
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO DISMISS

CAREN BISCHEL,
plaintiff,
vs.
HEATHER J. MERRITT, and SALT
LAKE COUNTY,

Civil No. 940900564PI
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

defendants.

Defendant Salt Lake County hereby moves this Court for an
Order dismissing plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff failed to file a proper Notice of Claim as required by
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and is now time barred from
bringing this action.

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1989) .

DATED this

'Z'Z.

day of February, 1994.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

:CHAEL/E. POSTMA
Jeputy/County Attorney

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this ^-X

day of February, 1994, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss
to the following:
SAMUEL KING
HAROLD J. DENT
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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Salt Lake County Attorney
By: MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313)
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (810) 468-3421
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY'S MOTION
TO DISMISS

CAREN BISCHEL,
plaintiff,
vs.
HEATHER J. MERRITT, and SALT
LAKE COUNTY,

Civil No. 940900564PI
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

defendants.

Salt Lake County respectfully submits the following
Memorandum in Support of Salt Lake County's Motion to Dismiss.
FACTS
1.

On February 1, 1993, plaintiff alleges that she was

injured in an automobile accident caused by Heather J. Merritt,
an employee of Salt Lake County.
2.

On April 23, 1993, plaintiff served a Notice of Claim

upon the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office.
Notice of Claim).

(See Exhibit 1,

The Notice of Claim was addressed to Ms. Trish

McDonald, Salt Lake County Attorney's Office.

This case waj filed on January 28,
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subdivision before an action may be instituted against the
governmental entity.

Specifically, the Governmental immunity Act

provi des:
A claim against a political subdivision, or
against its employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within the scope
of employment, or under color of authority, is barred
unless notice of claim is filed with the governing body
of the political subdivision within one year after the
claim arises
.
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See

Salt Lake County notes for the record that service upon
Commissioner is ineffective as to Salt Lake County.
The proper
process agent for Salt Lake County is the Salt Lake County Clerk.
See Rule 4 (e) (7) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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^racofipni!
342.

in

(i

i i

iiM^i.i,.

See also Sears v. Southwrt>M
3

i ii

Lamarr,, 'i-3 :'. 2 G at

5*3 .?. 2d r*2, 194 (Utah

19 7 7) ; Scarborough v. Granite School Dist, 5 31 P . 2d 4 8 0 (Utah
1975)

Furthermore, the notice of claim provision " I operates] as

a one yea r stati ite • :>f I iiiiilat-ii n

i i ,i • »>* MJ ;ugiiL aga i i..i i

governmental entity. "" Warren v. Provo Citzv Corp. , 3 3 8 P. 2d 1125
(Utah 1992) .

A timely notice of claim is required of ail

pj ainti ffs who woi i ] d

a«jd*.fcib.. a jt: i * i iiiii«nt ,»j. ent ih / ,

i 11^ » J

P l a i n t i f f ' s n o t i c e of c l a i m was not s e r v e d u p o n the
"governing b o d y " of Sa It Lake C o u n t y .

Rather

p] a i rrt: iff ' s n< Dti ce

o £ c 1 a 11 i i wa s s e i ve d up on t he S a .1 t Lak e Co un t > A11 o rney' s 0 £ £ i c e .
The county attorney's office is not the "governing body" of Salt
Lake Count}r.

The govern :i ng body of Sa 1 t: I .a k:e Coi ;i riti"]: / :i s t: he Salt

Lake County Commission.

Plaintiff has failed to file a proper

notice of claim as required by the Utah Governmental
A c t:

I" h e r e f o r e

Immunity

p 1 a i n t i f f s c o nip 1 a i n t s h o i i 1 d fa e d i s i n i s s e d.

Furthermore, plaintiff is now time barred from bringing suit
against Salt Lake County.
1992

Se< :it: :: : i

Plaintiff's claim arose on February 1,

60 3 0 • 2 3 i)£ the IJta 1 i Code requires that a Notice

of Claim must be filed "within one year after the claim a r i s e s . "
More than one year has passed si nee p] a i nt::i f f s c] a :i m a rose , a n ::I
plaintiff has not properly filed a Notice of Claim with the
governing body of Salt Lake County.
c o m D 1 a i n t: s h o u 1 :i b e d i s m i s s e d.

4

As such, plaintiff's

DATED this

day of FebruarSalt lake ITcuncy Attorney

MICHAEL/E. PGSTMA
iputy/County Attorney

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby cert if v that on this

A>-^ <ic

"t" "eDruar1

•><'i
1. ;:»','

d

mai-.ec a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in
Support of Salt Lake County's Motion to Dismiss to the following:
SAMUEL KING
HAROLD J. DENT
Attorneys for Plaintiff
212 0 South 12 0 0' East, No. :Ui
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 6

YdSffif

5

T.ib.'<

SAMUEL KING, N o . 1820
HAROLD J. DENT, JR., N o .
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, No
Salt Lake City, U T 84106
Telephones
< ' 486-3751
Facsimil
""* "753

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAREN BISCHEL,

)

PLAINTIFF'S

)
)

Plaintiff,

ANSWER
MOTION

VERIFIED

TO D E F E N D A N T ' S
TO DISMISS

)

vs.

)

HEATHER J. JUttut-i. and
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al.

)
)
1
\

)

Defendants.

Civil No. 940900564 PT
m d y e ..i uernuu i'reaerj.cx

Did plaintiff properly submit her claim on Salt Lake County?
The

pertinent statute
•'s « r—_

sairu

served

upon

i-q2._r.ax.

_i governmental en*-'.. •-.a--

"The governing

body

of the political

subdivisic
Liu a

t'afle,

plaintiff

made

service

as requested

by

defendant Salt Lake County.
fi i,". 11 MI ri i 'ii

1.

The statute

i I'II'T

does not specify which person

within the

political entity should be served.
2.

Tu m«k.i3 service **

» manner that would best

suit Salt

Lake County _ substantial volume of business, plaintiff's counsel

Samuel

King,

before serving

called

the Salt

Lake County

the

notice

of claim,

Commission and

personally

asked on

whom the

Commission wanted service to be made of the claim.
3.

Mr. King was

advised that the

claim should be

directly on the Salt Lake County attorney
He

was

referred

Attorney.

to Trish

McDonald,

He then spoke to

served

handling these claims.

Deputy

Trish McDonald on

Salt

Lake County

the telephone in

April, 1993.
4.

Ms. McDonald

referred

to her

advised Mr.

by the

County so

person received the pleadings, they

King that these
that to

claims were

be sure

the proper

should be mailed directly to

her as representative of the Salt Lake County Commission.
5.

Accordingly,

claim to Ms. McDonald.

Mr. King,

April 22,

1993, sent

the

With the notice, he sent a certified mail

return receipt which was
and returned to

on

signed in the County Attorney's

him April 23, 1993, by the

office

United States Postal

Service.
6.

It has been counsel's experience that

of a claim on a large entity
make it to
the

sometimes

has to be made, it is important

the precise person

entity's

authority

don't get

to

whenever service

handling it for the
do

so.

Otherwise,

appropriate attention

or are

to

entity, with
such

claims

lost

in the

shuffle.
7.
that

Salt Lake County is clearly aware of that problem.

reason, it set

should be

up a procedure

made by service

that service

of the claim
2

For

on the County

on the county

attorney

actually handling those claims.
8.

Plaintiff's counsel simply followed the

procedure that

Salt Lake County had in force and requested he follow.
9.

After service

by mail

on Ms,

McDonald, Mr, King

some conversations with her concerning handling of the claim.
appears that plaintiff's back injury is serious.
total

had
It

She had a prior

disability due to other back injuries, was almost ready to

go back to

work when

this accident occurred

and this

accident

aggravated her condition to the point where she is again disabled
and incapable of working.
her attending physicians

This poses a substantial
in determining the degree

her back attributable to this accident.
Ms.

McDonald agreed that the

within

one year

discovery, that
occurred

in

and

to

filing the suit

part with

Attorney who

it

and,

was best.

Coleen Cronin,

succeeded Ms.

of damage to

With that, Mr. King

case would be

expedite

problem for

and

difficult to settle
to

have

complete

These conversations

Deputy Salt

McDonald as handling

Lake County

claims against

Salt Lake County.
10.

When

that agreement

was reached,

plaintiff's counsel

then filed suit.
ARGUMENT
Any

entity

receiving

a

claim

has

the

discretion

of

designating a person

to receive that claim.

In this case, Salt

Lake

the claim

the

County

wanted

received

by

Deputy County

Attorney handling those claims.
Plaintiff

simply followed the procedure set up by Salt Lake
3

County.
As such:
a.

Service was properly made.

b.

The county,

having designated

the manner in

which it

wanted service of the claim made, has hereby waived any complaint
as to such service.
DATED March 4, 1994.
SAMUEL KING>^
STATE OF UTAH}
ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE}
COMES NOW Samuel King and being first duly sworn deposes and
says: 1. He is attorney for the plaintiff in the above entitled
action; 2. He has read the contents of the foregoing Answer and
they are true.

&z

SAMUEL KING " ^
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me March 4/, 1994.
/##SSB

HAZEL SYKES

!

i U < mam r \
I \>jSlkHK

J$!

I <:'--<25'y
J

P
..

Sa

Notar^ubllcX

7 Eas 0akv,e

^

' * »""• j

»STATE
Lake City
OF \i\wMVi
UTAH

/

•

«Y Commission Expires'-MAILING

CERTIFICATE

%%£"• • *S

I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Michael E.
Postma, Deputy County Attorney, 2001 South State St., #S340Q,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84190-1200, U. S. Mail, postage prepaid,
March 4, 1994.

Bischel.Answer
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Tab 4

DAVID E. YOCOM (#3581)
Salt Lake County Attorney
By: MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313)
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (810) 468-3421
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAREN BISCHEL,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS

plaintiff,
vs.
HEATHER J. MERRITT, and SALT
LAKE COUNTY,

Civil No. 940900564PI
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

defendants.

Defendants hereby submit the following Reply Memorandum in
Support of Defendants7 Motion to Dismiss.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff argues that service of her Notice of Claim was
proper because Salt Lake County designated the manner in which it
wanted service of the claim made, and Salt Lake County waived any
complaint as to such service.

However, Salt Lake County did not

waive the requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and
plaintiff failed to meet the requirements of that Act.
Plaintiff argues that the Governmental Immunity Act "does

not specify which person within the political entity should be
served [with the notice of claim]. " See Plaintiff's Verified
Answer to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at Hi.
statute is clear on this point.

However, the

The statute states that

plaintiff's Notice of Claim must be served upon the "governing
body of the political subdivision,"

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13.

The Salt Lake County Commission is the "governing body" of Salt
Lake County.

Ms. Trish McDonald, a claims adjustor in the county

attorney's office, is not the governing body of Salt Lake County.
Plaintiff's attorney is only required to follow the statutory
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, not the advice of
a county employee in the commission office.
and unambiguous.

The statute is clear

The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held

that where a cause of action is based upon a statute, full
compliance with its requirements is a condition precedent to the
right to maintain suit.

See Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of

Transp., 828 P.2d 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Plaintiff has failed

to comply with the statutory requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act.

As such, plaintiff's complaint should be

dismissed.
Plaintiff further argues that it has been "[plaintiff's]
counsel's experience that whenever service of a claim on a large
entity has to be made, it is important to make it to the precise
2

person handling it for the entity, with the entity's authority to
do so.

Otherwise, such claims sometimes don't get appropriate

attention or are lost in the shuffle."

See Plaintiff's Verified

Answer to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at %6.

It is

disingenuous of plaintiff to argue that the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act should be ignored because Salt Lake County is a
large entity, and a Notice of Claim may get "lost in the
shuffle."

By this argument plaintiff tries to excuse her own

neglect with the rumored neglect of "large entities."
argument should not be allowed to succeed.

This

The procedure that

Salt Lake County follows is that procedure set out in the
Governmental Immunity Act, and "strict compliance" is required.
If proper service of plaintiff's Notice of Claim was made, and
plaintiff's complaint was "lost in the shuffle," then plaintiff's
complaint would have been deemed denied after ninety days and
plaintiff would be entitled to file suit.

However, plaintiff did

not file her claim as required.
Furthermore, plaintiff's attorney was aware of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act and the necessity to file suit within
one year, yet he ignored the Act's Notice of Claim requirements.
See Plaintiff's Verified Answer to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,

3

at f9.* Salt Lake County has done nothing to waive its right to
strict compliance with the notice requirement of section 63-3 013.

Therefore, plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed.
DATED this

If

day of February, 1994.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

MLCHAEL^E. POSTMA
Deputy ^county Attorney

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this

//

day of March, 1994, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Memorandum
in Support of Defendants7 Motion to Dismiss to the following:
SAMUEL KING
HAROLD J. DENT
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

1

Plaintiff's attorney is under the incorrect assumption that
Ms. Trish McDonald and Ms. Coleen Cronin are Deputy Salt Lake
County Attorney's.
Ms. McDonald was a claims adjustor in the
county attorney's office, and Ms. Cronin is the Salt Lake County
Risk Manager.
4
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DAVID E. YOCOM (#3581)
Salt Lake County Attorney
By: MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313)
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (810) 468-3421
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAREN BISCHEL,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

plaintiff,
vs.
HEATHER J. MERRITT, and SALT
LAKE COUNTY,

Civil No. 9409005S4PI
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

defendants.

The Court having reviewed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,
Plaintiff's Verified Answer to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, and for good cause shown;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT plaintiff's complaint is
dismissed.

Plaintiff failed to file a proper Notice of Claim as

required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and is now timebarred from bringing this action.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this

#

•Ofl day

4>

of

., 199-3<

BY THE COURT

Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this &S2.

day of March, 1994,

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF
DISMISSAL to the following:
SAMUEL KING
HAROLD J. DENT
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

2

Tab 6

SAMUEL KING, No. 1820
HAROLD J. DENT, JR., No. 0871
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-3751
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAREN BISCHEL,
Plaintiff,

)
)
;l

P L A I N T I F F ' S MOTION TO
SET ASIDE ORDER OF
DISMISSAL

vs.
HEATHER J . MERRITT, and
SALT LAKE COUNTY, e t a l .

C i v i l No. 940900564 PI

Defendants.

Plaintiff

moves

plaintiff's complaint

the

Judge J . D e n n i s

court

rescind

for the reasons

Frederick

its order

set forth in

dismissing
the annexed

memorandum.
DATED April 28, 1994.
SAMUEL KING
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify

I mailed a

copy of

Postma, Deputy County Attorney, 2001
Lake

the foregoing to

Michael E.

So. State St., #S3400, Salt

City, UT 84190-1200, U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, April 28,

1994.

Bischel.Motion
1

SAMUEL KING, No. 1820
HAROLD J. DENT, JR., No. 0871
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-3751
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAREN BISCHEL,
Plaintiff,

)
)
;)
|

P L A I N T I F F ' S MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF
DISMISSAL

])

C i v i l No. 9 4 0 9 0 0 5 6 4 PI

vs.
HEATHER J . MERRITT, and
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a t a l .
Defendants.

i

Judge J . D e n n i s

Frederick

BASIS FOR MOTION
This motion is made pursuant to Rules 4(e)(11); 6(b); 59(b),
(e); 60(b)(7), and 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
TIMELINESS
The

court's Order

of

based on plaintiff's alleged
Lake County Board of

Dismissal

of plaintiff's

complaint

failure to properly serve the

Commissioners was signed and

Salt

entered March

29, 1994.
This motion is filed more than ten days later due to the the
Salt Lake County attorney's failure to comply with Rule 4-504(4),
Utah

Code of Judicial Administration,

which puts the

party obtaining an order to give notice to the opposing
its date of entry.

The County Attorney did not do so.
1

duty on a
party of

This situation

was expressly addressed in

Workman v. Nacle

Const.Inc., 802 P2d 749 (Utah App. 1990).
In Workman, in a virtually identical situation where the ten
day time limit to file a motion to set aside
by

Rule

59(e) U.R.C.P.,

was

not

an order prescribed

followed because

prevailing

counsel violated Rule 4-504(4) by not mailing notice of the entry
of

the

judgment

judgment was

to the

opposing

effective as of its

party,

the

court held

date, but that the

the

failure of

prevailing party to honor the rule requiring timely notice to the
losing party
Rule

brought the case squarely within

60(b)(7),

"Any other

reason

the provisions of

justifying

relief from

the

operation of the judgment ... ."
Workman held that

a prevailing party's breach of their duty

to give timely notice to the other party is a "weighty factor" to
be considered in determining whether a late motion seeking relief
from an order should be considered on the merits.
That

is, the opposing motion is

not late if the party with

the duty to give notice of date of entry breaches that duty.
The breaching party also has no standing to argue timeliness
of the other, the breacher not being able to cause delay and then
complain of it.
This is consistent

with the concept of justice and fairness

8tated in Rule 6, "Time," (b) "Enlargement," U.R.C.P.,

that time

may be enlarged to allow for "excusable neglect."
Similarly, under Rule 61, U.R.C.P., "Harmless Error,"

2

". . . no error or defect ... in anything done
by the court or any of the parties, is ground
for
granting a new
trial or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order unless such
refusal to take such action appears to the
court Inconsistent with substantial justice.
The court at every stage of the proceeding
must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding
which
does
not effect
the
substantial right of the parties.M [Emphasis
added.]
In this case, the
matter of balance,
Salt

argument is particularly important,

because the attack on notice of

Lake County attorney is

claim by the

so entirely technical

(as will be

discussed infra) that the Workman rationale is persuasive in
case

at bar.

That is,

plaintiff's

counsel, being so technically
the

as a

counsel expected

the

defense

demanding of plaintiff, to observe

technicalities itself, and to give notice of the actual date

of entry of the judgment.
notice

Instead, the county attorney gave only

of the proposed judgment, not notice of the date of entry

nor of the final form of the judgment as approved

or modified by

the court,
ARGUMENT
POINT

I. MEHITS

THE COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS
BASED ON A MISTAKEN- ASSUMPTION OF FACT
The

County Commission

has not

denied

that it

itself was

properly served with plaintiff's claim.
The

only facts in the

plaintiff's
Commission
verified

record relative to

service of Notice of
are those

answer in

submitted

Claim on the
by plaintiff's

opposition to
3

the motion

the propriety of
Salt Lake County
counsel in
of the

his

Salt Lake

County Attorney to dismiss.
Plaintiff did in fact serve
in

the Salt Lake County Commission

the manner requested by that commission itself and as further

directed by a
only after

deputy county

attorney, Trish McDonald,

receiving those instructions

It was

that plaintiff's

claim

was served by mail addressed to Trish McDonald.
Plaintiff's

affidavit

rebuttal affidavit

by the

so states.

Defense

Salt Lake County

has filed

Commission nor

no
any

member thereof.
The court's erroneous assumption
as

of fact was that accepting

true a simple allegation without factual support filed by the

Salt Lake County Attorney denying service was properly
the

Salt Lake

County

statement by the Salt
not served.
To the
to

Commission.

contrary, the Salt Lake

governing board,
(Rule 4(e)(11)
papers

on it

verified
it was

called and asked
made, which could

upon whom the
be "...

its

or secretary," he

U. R. C. P.)/ he was advised by the commission to
submitted

directly

There is no denial by

of its

a

County Commission indicated

or to its executive employee

attorney serves as a
one

not

It itself has made no such allegation.

Commission wanted service

attorney.

is

Lake County Commission itself that

plaintiff's counsel, when he

have the

This

made upon

Salt

Lake

County

the Commission itself that such

designated agent of its governing
employees, nor

who

answered the phone, could not designate the county attorney.

The

says service should

that

board as

its secretary,

statute

executive

to the

be made upon
4

"the governing body."

Neither

the statute, nor the governing body, say the county unit

can't designate an executive, secretary or some other agent, such
as

its attorney, to receive

the service.

case, based on the facts now in the
made on the
This

Accordingly, in this

record, service was

Salt Lake County Commission in the

complies with

service on

a county

in fact

manner it chose.

as per

Rule 4(e) (11),

U.R.C.P.
POINT II.
HYPERTECHNICALITY
The
does not

Motion to Dismiss made by the Salt Lake County Attorney
even show that it

is approved by the

Salt Lake County

Commission itself.
The

Salt Lake County Commission

approach that it will
with

legitimate claims

may well in

fact take the

deal fairly, rather than hypertechnically,
presented to

it by citizens

injured by

misconduct of the county's employees.
Such an
handling

of

approach would be
the

good politics as well

relationship

between

the

citizen

as a fair
and

her

government.
Lacking any affirmative factual denial by the Commission, or
its

knowledge or

dismiss, we have

approval

of the

no basis to believe

County Attorney's

motion to

the County itself has

any

objection.
The

only reason that the motion to

change in deputy county attorneys.

5

dismiss was filed was a

When the notice of claim was first served on Trish McDonald,
as shown in
to

plaintiff's counsel's verified answer

dismiss, discussions

counsel
both

were

in which the merits

as to

the

facts of

injuries.

Ultimately,

evalutate

and get a clear

file suit.

had between

to the motion

her and

plaintiff's

of plaintiff's claim was discussed,
the accident

those

and

injuries

as to

being

plaintiff's

difficult

prognoisis, the decision

That was done

near the end of

to

was made to

the statutory period

but was done timely, which is all the law requires.
It was only
that

through change of

the technicality

was

the deputy county

raised.

Had

attorneys

Ms. McDonald

advised

plaintiff that she was not authorized by the County Commission to
act for it in receiving notice of a claim, the

notice would have

been resubmitted.
Rules
section
the

6

and 61

U.R.C.P have

been

as dealing with the urge of

cases before them.

considered,

with

procedure, to

its

Similarly,
three

cited in

the courts to do justice in
Rule 1, U.R.C.P.,

magnificent

be handled in such

the previous

adjectives

manner as to be

should be
—

civil

"just, speedy

and inexpensive."
The Salt
kind.
on

Lake County Attorney

It relies as its primary

LaMarr v.

State Dept.

of

claims no

prejudice of

any

case in support of its position
Transp., 828

P2d 535

(Utah App.

1992).
LaMarr is not
required

to

make

dispositive.
dual

In LaMarr,

service
6

on

both

the plaintiff
the

Department

was
of

Transportation and
on one
This

the attorney general.

of those entities.

was held to

No

Service

service was made

be fatally defective when

was made only
on the

other.

the time for filing

claims had run.
This

case concerns the

manner of

making service.

LaMarr

dealt only with no service at all.
PQ1NT 111.
ESTOPPEL
Plaintiff concedes
entity based on

it is difficult to

conduct of

its agents or

estop a governmental
employees.

However,

that doctrine does have limitations.
The only issue

here is a simple one.

Commission itself established
of a

claim.

department.
to any degree

That

was

The Salt Lake County

a procedure for

to serve

it

receiving service

directly upon

its

legal

Those facts are stated by plaintiff and not rebutted
by the county.

Is the

county now in a

position

where it can say, having told a plaintiff that it itself could be
served by serving
from

its executive and agent,

saying that plaintiff was

a fool for

the county attorney,
believing the County

Commission?
Utah's

closest case and most recent in point isn't in point

on the facts as it deals with

the developer relying on acts of a

county commission, but the identifying concept is clear.
v.

Summit County, (233 Utah Adv. Rep.

case:

7

Stucker

11; 1993) holding in that

"The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
equitable estoppel applies only when 'the
county has committed an act or omission upon
which the developer could rely in good faith
in making substantial changes in position or
incurring extensive expenses,'" (Citations
omitted.)
That holding,
committed

applies specifically here,

i.e., the

county

an act upon which a claimant reasonably relied in good

faith, and her filing her

claim as designated by the

county was

the equivalent of the "substantial changes of position" and "good
faith" referred to in Stucker.
The

county is

estopped, has

no standing,

to say

a party

serving a claim may not follow the procedure the county directs.
SUMMARY
For the foregoing reasons,

plaintiff moves the court vacate

its order dismissing the complaint.
DATED April 28, 1994.
SAMUEL KING

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I

certify I mailed

a copy of

the foregoing

Postma, Deputy County Attorney, 2001 So.
Lake City, UT 84190-1200,

to Michael E.

State St., #S3400, Salt

U. S. Mail, postage prepaid,

1994.
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DAVID E.YOCOM (#3581)
Salt Lake County Attorney
By: MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313)
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (810) 468-3421
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET
ASIDE ORDER OF DISMISSAL

CAREN BISCHEL,
plaintiff.
vs.
HEATHER J. MERRITT, and SALT LAKE
COUNTY,

Civil No. 940900564PI
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

defendants.

Defendants hereby submit the following Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal
ARGUMENT
I

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT SHOULD
NOT BE GRANTED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ARTICULATED
SUFFICIENT REASONS JUSTIFYING RELIEF

Plaintiffs motion for relief from judgment should not be granted because plaintiff has not

aniculated sufficient reasons justifying relief. Rule 60(b)(7) allows for relieffromjudgment for
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." "Relief under this
subsection embodies three requirement: 'First that the reason be one other than those listed in
subdivisions (1) through (6); second, that the reason justify relief; and third, that the motion be
made within a reasonable time.'" Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.. 817 P.2d 382, 387
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1304. 1306-07
(Utah 1982). Also, subsection (7) "should be very cautiously and sparingly invoked by the Court
only in unusual and exceptional instances." Id. (quoting Hughes v. Sanders. 287 F.Supp. 332,
334 (E.D.Okla. 1968)).
Plaintiff has failed to meet the second requirement of this rule, that the reason justify
relief. Plaintiff has merely reargued and recharacterized the same arguments plaintiff made in
opposition to defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Merely recharacterizing losing arguments should
not be an adequate reason to provide plaintiff relieffromjudgment. Such arguments fail to
satisfy the court's rigorous demands that subsection (7) be "very cautiously and sparingly
invoked," and only in "unusual and exceptional instances."
A,

THE COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS NOT BASED UPON
A MISTAKEN ASSUMPTION OF FACT

Plaintiff argues that the only facts in the record relative to the propriety of plaintiff s
service of Notice of Claim on the Salt Lake County Commission are those submitted by
plaintiffs counsel in his verified answer. Plaintiff further argues that the Salt Lake County
2

Commission was required to file an affidavit in rebuttal to plaintiffs counsel's verified answer.
However, plaintiffs arguments must fail.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss indicates that "[o]n April 23, 1993, plaintiff served a
Notice of Claim upon the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office." Defendants motion then
indicates that the Notice of claim is attached as Exhibit 1. The only error in defendants Motion
to Dismiss is that defendants inadvertently failed to attach the Notice of Claim as Exhibit 1.
Although the Notice of Claim was referenced, it was inadvertently not included with the motion.
To remedy this oversight plaintiffs Notice of Claim is attached to this Memorandum in
Opposition as Exhibit 1. This exhibit, which clearly shows that the Notice of Claim was served
upon Trish McDonald of the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, accompanied with the notice
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act are all the "facts" necessary for defendants
to succeed on their motion. Defendants are not required to obtain a rebuttal affidavit from the
Salt Lake County Commission. Plaintiff failed to rebut the facts and law argued by defendants in
their motion to dismiss. As such, a counter affidavit is not required. Plaintiffs affidavit simply
does not address the relevant issue of service of plaintiff s notice of claim upon the "governing
body" of Salt Lake County. Furthermore, plaintiffs argument fails to adequately deal with the
statutory provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Plaintiff further argues that she did in fact serve the Salt Lake County Commission in the
manner requested by the commission itself and as further directed by a deputy county attorney,
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Trish McDonald. As a point of clarification, Ms. Trish McDonald is not an attorney and was at
no time employed as a deputy Salt Lake County Attorney. Ms. McDonald was a claims adjuster
in the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. See Exhibit 2, Sawaya affidavit. This fact was
pointed out several times in defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss. However, plaintiffs counsel seems to have ignored this point. Nonetheless, the
substance of plaintiff s argument was raised by plaintiff in Plaintiffs Verified Answer to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and countered by defendants in their Reply Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act is clear and
unambiguous. Plaintiff is required to file her notice of claim upon the "governing body" of Salt
Lake County. Any legal advice that plaintiffs attorney desired should have come from the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act itself and not from a secretary employed by the Salt Lake County
Commission. A claims adjuster in the county attorney's office is simply not the governing body
of Salt Lake County. All doubts about who plaintiff should have served her notice of claim upon
should have been resolved by the statutory source that created the notice of claim requirement.
Plaintiff further argues that service of her notice of claim was made on the Salt Lake
County Commission in the manner it chose. However, plaintiff is incorrect in this assumption.
Salt Lake County has at no time waived the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity
Act. Salt Lake County requires strict compliance with the terms of the Governmental Immunity
Act. Sse Exhibit 2, Sawaya affidavit. There is simply no support for plaintiffs argument that the
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Salt Lake County Commission has chosen to disregard the immunity act and allow service of
notice by alternative means.
Finally, plaintiff argues that service upon the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
"complies with service on a county as per Rule 4(e)(l 1), U.R.C.P." Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Set Aside Judgment at 5. This assertion by plaintiff is incorrect in several
respects. First, service of a notice of claim is not governed by Rule 4(e)(l 1), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Service of a notice of claim is governed by Utah Code Ann § 63-30-13. Second,
Rule 4 deals with service of process, not service of a notice of claim. Finally, even if Rule 4
were to apply to the facts of the present case, subsection 11 is not the correct subsection.
Subsection 11 provides for service upon a department or agency of the state of Utah. Salt Lake
County is not a department or agency of the state of Utah. The correct subsection, if Rule 4 were
to apply, is subsection 7. Subsection 7 indicates that proper service upon a county is
accomplished by serving the "county clerk of such county." A claims adjuster in the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office is not the County Clerk of Salt Lake County. Therefore, even if Rule 4
were applicable, which it clearly is not, plaintiff has still failed to comply with its provisions.
B.

STRICT COMPLIANCE IS REQUIRED BY THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT, NOT "HYPERTECHNICALITY"

Plaintiff argues that "[t]he Motion to Dismiss made by the Salt Lake County Attorney
does not even show that it is approved by the Salt Lake County Commission itself." "The Salt
Lake County Commission may well in fact take the approach that it will deal fairly, rather than
5

hypertechnically, with legitimate claims presented to it by citizens injured by the misconduct of
the county's employees." Plaintiffs argument, however, borders on the absurd. An argument
analogous to plaintiffs argument would be that "defendants have no way of knowing whether
plaintiff in fact desires to sue Salt Lake County." "Plaintiff may well take the position that she
does not want to sue Salt Lake County."
The Salt Lake County Attorney's Office is the legal representative of Salt Lake County.
Since the Salt Lake County Commission is non sui juris, the only way to challenge the actions of
the commission is to sue the county. The Salt Lake County Attorney's Office moved to dismiss
plaintiffs lawsuit on behalf of defendants Salt Lake County and Heather J. Merritt. Salt Lake
County is the county attorney's client. The county attorney's office acts for and on behalf of its
client, just as plaintiffs counsel acts for and on behalf of plaintiff. To argue that the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office does not represent the views of its client completely ignores the
realities of county government and the nature of the layer/client relationship.
Furthermore, plaintiffs "hypertechnicality" argument is completely without merit. As
was discussed in defendants Motion and Reply, "actual notice cannot cure a failure to comply
with the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of
Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Varoz v. Sevev. 506 P.2d 435 (Utah
1973)). See also Sears v. Southworth. 563 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1977). The Utah Supreme Court
has consistently held that where a cause of action is based upon a statute, full compliance with its
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requirements is a condition precedent to the right to maintain a suit. Lamarr. 828 P.2d at 542.
See 3lso Se^rs v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1977); Scarborough v. Granite School
Dist. 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975). Full compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act requires
service of plaintiffs notice of claim upon the governing body of Salt Lake County. Plaintiff has
not fully complied with statute. Lamarr is absolutely on point in this regard. What was fatally
defective in Lamarr was plaintiffs failure to fully comply with the notice requirements of the
immunity act. Similarly, plaintiffs action is fatally defective because she failed to fully comply
with the notice provision of the immunity act. Plaintiffs counsel was sufficiently familiar with
the Governmental Immunity Act to realize that suit must be filed prior to the running of the
statute of limitations, yet plaintiffs counsel urges a more liberal reading of the notice
requirement. Plaintiff simply cannot have it both ways.
Finally, plaintiff argues that M[t]he only reason that the motion to dismiss was filed was a
change in deputy county attorneys." Plaintiffs argument is simply wrong. As was discussed
earlier, Ms. Trish McDonald was at no time employed as a deputy county attorney. There was
no change in deputy county attorneys. Plaintiffs case was assigned to a deputy county attorney
as soon as plaintiffs complaint was filed. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was filed because the
issue was ripe. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was filed because plaintiff failed to comply with
the notice provisions of the immunity act. To argue that a motion to dismiss was filed for any
other reason is simply to argue facts that do not exist.
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II.

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE INVOKED AGAINST SALT
LAKE COUNTY AND THE SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION

Plaintiff argues that defendants are estopped from asserting that plaintiff incorrectly filed
her notice of claim because a secretary in the Salt Lake County Commission's office gave
plaintiff poor legal advice. However, as conceded by plaintiff, it is difficult to estop a
governmental entity based on conduct of its agents or employees.
The controlling case in this area is Utah State Univ. v, Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715 (Utah
1982). In Sutro the Utah Supreme Court held: "We have no doubt about the soundness nor the
salutary purpose of the rule that estoppel generally is not assertable against the government or
governmental institutions." Id. at 718. There is a limited exception to this general principle for
unusual circumstances "where it is plain that the interests of justice so require." Id. at 720. This
exception applies only if "the facts may be found with such certainty, and the unjustice suffered
is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." Id"The few cases in which Utah courts have permitted estoppel against the government
have involved very specific written representations by authorized government entities."

Anderson v. Public Service Comm'n of Utah, 839 P.2d 822,827 (Utah 1992). See Celebrity
Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm.. 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979) (relying on written
representations by the Liquor Control Commission that the location of a proposed liquor store in
a proposed private club facility satisfied the 600 foot zoning requirement); Eldredge v. Utah
State Retirement Bd.. 795 P.2d 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (representatives of the retirement office
8

made oral and written statements assuring plaintiff that he would be credited with the years of
employment in question). In Anderson the Utah Supreme Court reiterated that only 'Veilsubstantiated representations by government entities" would be sufficient to estop a
governmental entity. Anderson. 839 P.2d at 828.
In the present case plaintiff has failed to sufficiently substantiate her allegation that a
secretary in the Salt Lake County Commission's office instructed plaintiffs counsel to file her
notice of claim with a claims adjuster employed in the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office.
There are no written statements or representations memorializing this conversation. Without
such evidence, plaintiffs bare allegations fall far short of the required "well-substantiated
representations" required by Utah Courts. This is the very reason why Utah courts consistently
hold that estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity.
The only case plaintiff cites in support of her estoppel argument is Stucker v. Summit
County. 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1994). In Stucker the court of appeals
found that, "equitable estoppel applies only when 'the county [has] committed an act or omission
upon which the developer could rely in good faith in making substantial changes in position or
incurring extensive expenses.'" Li. at 15. Plaintiff argues that "the county committed an act
upon which [plaintiff] reasonably relied in good faith, and her [sic] filing her claim as designated
by the county was the equivalent of the 'substantial changes of position' and 'good faith' referred
to in Stucker." Plaintiffs Memorandum at 8.
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However, the county did not commit an act upon which plaintiff could rely in good faith.
The act that plaintiff relied upon was a telephone call by her attorney to a secretary in the Salt
Lake County Commission's office. Plaintiff does not allege that a County Commissioner waived
the requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Furthermore, plaintiff does not allege
that a written waiver was obtained by plaintiff. Plaintiff relied upon an oral representation by an
unnamed and unaccountable employee of the commission's office staff in determining where to
file her notice of claim. This is not the type of act which plaintiff should rely upon in good faith,
particularly in light of the fact that the notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
are clear and unambiguous, and contrary to the advice plaintiff was given. As such. Salt Lake
County should not be estopped to assert plaintiffs failure to comply with the notice provisions of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
III.

SANCTIONS

This court should sanction plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel under Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, for requiring defendants to reply to plaintiffs frivolous Motion to Set Aside
Order of Dismissal. Plaintiffs motion is not well grounded in existing fact or law. The issues
were clearly and fully argued prior to this Court's entry of judgment in favor of defendants.
Therefore, plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel should be required to pay the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Set
Aside Order of Dismissal.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside
Order of Dismissal.
DATED this 9^~ day of May, 1994.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake Countv Attomev

MICHAEL E. POSTMA
Deputy County Attorney

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this j * * ^ day of May, 1994.1 mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order of
Dismissal to the following:
SAMUEL KING
HAROLD J. DENT
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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EXHIBIT 1

KING & DENT
Attorneys
at Law
amtel King

An Association of Sole

arold J. Dent, Jr.
r1c P. Hartman

Practitioners

2120 South 1300 East, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

April 22,

Telephone (801)486-3751
Fax Ho.

(801)486-3753

1993

RECEIVED
Ms. Trish McDonald
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
201 South State S t - — S-3400
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84190-1200

Re:

APR 2 3 f0Q3
COUNTY ATTORNEY

RISK MANAGEMENT
Caren A. Bichsel—claimant
Heather J- Merritt—county representative

Dear Ms. McDonald:
On February 1, 1993, an accident occurred involving three vehicles.
Heather J. Merritt was driving a Salt Lake County 19 85 blue
Citation, license number 133 85 EX.
Felicia Hill was driving a
1978 Oldsmobile stationwagon.
My client, Caren Bichsel, was
driving a 1980 Ford Thunderbird.
The accident occurred at approximately 3:45 P.M. at 3546 South
West.
Ms. Bichsel, driving north, was going to turn into
Children's Shelter. She saw Heather's vehicle coming out of
shelter parking lot onto 7th West. She saw Heather looking at
rather than north for oncoming traffic.
At the same time,
Bichsel saw the vehicle driven by Felicia traveling south on
West.

700
the
the
her
Ms.
7th

Ms. Bichsel had her turn signal on. It appeared to her there would
be a collision because Heather was pulling into the street right in
front of the line being followed by Felicia. Ms. Bichsel applied
her brakes and sropped south of where she would have made the turn
into the Shelter parking lot. Heather started to enter 7th West,
turning south.
Ms. Hill swerved left, toward Ms. Bichsel, but
still hit the rear of Heather's vehicle.
The impact flipped
Felicia's vehicle sideways and it collided head-on with the Bichsel
vehicle which was then stopped.
That is, it hit the front of Ms.
Bichsel's car with the side of Felicia's.
Ms. Bichsel's understanding was that Heather was a volunteer
driving children for the county. She was also told that Heather
had just completed defensive driving school two days before.
Photographs of the accident were taken by Tony Montano, a county
employee. The accident was investigated by Deputy R. E. Rook, Salt
Lake County Sheriff's office.

Ms. Trish McDonald
April 22, 1993
Page 2
It would seem the accident was directly caused by the failure to
keep a proper lookout of Heather.
There may be a question of
contributory negligence on the part of Felicia.
That is, should
she have reacted sooner as Ms. Bichsel did?
Injury:
Before this accident occurred, Ms. Bichsel, who had been
a long line semi-truck driver, had had three back operations
resulting from vehicle accidents. Two were performed in Salt Lake
County by Dr. Robert Home.
The last one was performed by Dr.
Robert Williams, a neurologist in LasVegas.
As a result, Ms.
Bichsel is receiving early total disability benefits from Social
Security. Her medical bills are met by Medicare and Medicaid.
Since this accident occurred, Ms. Bichsel, who was ambulatory and
capable of driving, has had her pre-existing back problems greatly
worsened together with new problems incident to the collision. She
had her seat belt fastened when the accident occurred. She has had
medical expense to date for injuries through her back from neck to
lumbar area of almost $4,000 to date.
We are unable to evaluate the degree of her injury at this time
because of the pre-existing complications.
The neck is a new
problem. Her prior injuries have not involved it.
Ms. Bichsel is being attended by Wayne Hebertson, neurologist, as
primary attending physician.
She is receiving physical therapy
from Lance Himelwright at Cottonwood Hospital. To this date, 2 1/2
months after the accident, she has endured an intense level of pain
that she wasn't suffering prior to the accident and is disabled to
a higher degree than she had been before the accident. She can't
drive. She receives taxi through welfare and Grocery Maid for her
groceries.
Damages: I would estimate Ms. Bichsel ''s damages incident to
February 1, 1993, accident at a minimum of $100,000.

the

Enclosed is Ms. Bichsel's authorization for me and my associate,
Harold J. Dent, Jr., to represent Caren in regard to this accident.
Please contact me concerning this matter.
Sincerely,
SAMUEL KING
SK/has
cc: Caren Bichsel

EXHIBIT 2

DAVID E.YOCOM (#3581)
Salt Lake County Attorney
By: MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313)
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (810) 468-3421
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CAREN BISCHEL.

AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD SAWAYA

plaintiff,
vs.
HEATHER J. MERRITT, and SALT LAKE
COUNTY,

Civil No. 940900564PI
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

}
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

}

I, DONALD SAWAYA, having been duly sworn upon oath, hereby depose and state as
follows:
1. I am over the age of 21 years and have personal knowledge of the facts set forth
herein.

2. I am the Chief Deputy of the Governmental Services Division, of the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office.
3. During April, 1993, Ms. Irish McDonald was employed by the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office as a claims adjuster. Ms. McDonald is not an attorney and was at no time
employed as a deputy Salt Lake County Attorney.
4. Ms. McDonald is not the "governing body" of Salt Lake County, nor has she been
authorized to accept notices of claim on behalf of the governing body of Salt Lake County.
5. On April 23, 1994, a Notice of Claim was mailed to Ms. Trish McDonald of the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office. No other notice of claim has been received by Salt Lake County
on behalf of plaintiff Caren A Bischel.
6. Salt Lake County has at no time waived the notice provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. Salt Lake County requires strict compliance with all terms of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Dated this 7«^ day of May, 1994.

DONALD SAWAYA C /
Chief Deputy, Governmental
Services Division
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this

NOTAKY Ft.*L,L*C
C!r.^; Lynn v;;:Ksn3s
r - * : couth 1100 w»st
Sslt Lake City, Utsh 84123
My Commission Expires
F«oruary 18. 1997
8TATE OF UTAH

Q&'day of May, 1994.

Notary Publjic

mmo>
0

My commission expires:
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SAMUEL KING, No. 1820
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-3751
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAREN BISCHEL,
Plaintiff,
|
;

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY

vs.
HEATHER J. MERRITT, and
SALT LAKE COUNTY, at al.

]
]|

Civil No. 940900564 PI
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
ISSUE

The issue is one of fact, not of law.
ARGUMENT
The fact,

as supported by Plaintiffs

verified pleading, is

that Plaintiff did properly serve the Salt Lake County Commission
in the manner designated by the Commission.
To rebut that fact

an affidavit by the Commission

would be

required, that it did not so authorize.
That affidavit would have to be

factual.

It would have

to

state that the Salt Lake County Commission had not designated the
County Attorney to receive Plaintiff's claim.
Lacking such
County

an affidavit,

having been served

and it

in the manner

complain thereof.

1

is

lacking, Salt

that it

Lake

chose may not

What

is key here

is that the

voiced no

County itself has

objection•
Commissioner

Horiuchi,

embarrassed by the Motion
of

course

we'll accept

for

example,

might

to Dismiss of its agent,
service.

Plaintiff

well

be

and say "But

only did

what we

asked."
We

lack the County's level.

We have

does

County

only its' attorney'&

level.
It

not

lie

with

the

positions and say Plaintiff was a
first Baid.

Attorney

to

reverse

fool for believing in what

That would lie with the County and

it

the County ha£

not so stated.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's complaint should be reinstated.

DATED this

Z/' day of y ^ ^

t 1994

-Sa&iue 1 King
Attorney for Plaintiff

E.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Michael
Poatma, Deputy County Attorney, 2001 South State Street,
2

#S3400, Salt lake City,
prepaid, May 18, 1994.
DATED this

/fl

Utah

84190-1200,

day of ~77?jA?

U.S. Mail,

1994.

Samuel King
~7/?
Attorney for Plaintiff

carenbi.pla
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postage
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DAVID E. YOCOM (#3581)
Salt Lake County Attorney
By. MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313)
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (810) 468-3421
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
CAREN BISCHEL.
plaintiff.
vs.
HEATHER J. MERRITT, and SALT LAKE
COUNTY.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF
DISMISSAL, AND DENYING
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR
SANCTIONS
Civil No. 940900564PI
Judae J. Dennis Frederick

defendants.

The Court having reviewed Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal,
Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal
and for good cause shown;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal is
denied. Plaintiff failed to anicuiate sufficient reasons justifying relief, the trial Court's Order of
Dismissal was not based upon a mistaken assumption of fact, strict compliance is required by the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act's Notice of Claim provisions, and equitable estoppel may not

be invoked against SaJt Lake County and the Salt Lake County Commission. It is also hereby
ordered that Defendants' request for sanctions is denied.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

\%^y

of

kjff

- 1994.

BY THE COURT

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I herebv certify that on this

day of June, 1994,1 mailed a true and correct copy of

the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF
DISMISSAL, AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS to the
following:
SAMUEL KING
HAROLD J. DENT
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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